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Abstract: The Western-based utopian dream of internet-enabled technology was to overcome distance, allow widespread 
participation, and forge a shared view of core political issues on complex matter such as justice, economy, and the 
environment. Politics increasingly takes to social media platforms, enlisting them as tools for gauging and influencing 
public opinion. This is the case for the Rousseau platform in Italy, designed by the popular anti-establishment party in Italy, 
‘M5S’ or the Five Star Movement. In reference to Jean-Jacques Rousseau, in particular his ‘Social Contract’, it promises to 
deliver politics more directly to the people by proposing legislation in the online space, allowing members to vote via the 
platform, educating on and discussing regulations, and more. It aligns well with political utopias envisioned by the internet 
pioneers. The emancipatory potential and political power that AI brings to these platforms, their political developers, and 
the membership, is immediately apparent. But is there not a darker side to these technologies, as they become more 
advanced in gathering and analysing data, making intelligent predictions, and subsequently manipulating cognitive 
tendencies for the purpose of politics? We discuss some of the critiques and technical functions that may cast reasonable 
doubt on the participatory ideals, particularly related to relational surveillance as a dystopian issue. This may remind us of 
the Cambridge Analytica effect; but the influence of AI on these political platforms is not (yet) a criminal offence. Can AI 
enable the direct democracy which internet pioneers envisioned, or is it actually bringing us the totalitarian nightmare of 
the ‘Brave New World’? If we harness AI to bring about greater democracy, individual empowerment, and emancipation of 
societies - this would bring about better worlds. But these tools so easily become corrupt. Is there not a darker side to 
these technologies, as they become more advanced in surveillance practices, making intelligent predictions, 
andsubsequently manipulating cognitive tendencies for the purpose of politics? 
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1. Introduction and Background 
The intersection of politics and the internet creates a contested space. On the one hand, scholars believe that 
the online space can facilitate positive, successful politics.  In Politicizing Digital Space, Smith (2017) for 
example discusses the public rejection of (what is seen as) the traditional political establishment, and feels this 
reinforces the hope in a conception of politics which becomes more participatory and offers direct citizen 
empowerment, individual agency, and democratic freedom. Such ‘platform politics’ (Lioy, Del Valle & Gottlieb, 
2019) would appear to be the case of, for example, the Rousseau platform – the party platform of M5S, or the 
Five Star Movement (a popular, populist Italian party). But perhaps it can be said that no tool can be truly 
neutral, as it depends on people for its uses. The online space is a constructed one, technologically speaking, 
but also socially, and politically. The first paragraph below will revisit some of the imaginative vision developed 
during the Cold War era in the US, to draw out a hopeful political space.  
On the flip side, as Bartlett (2018) describes, technology and democracy are locked ‘in a bitter conflict’ in this 
online space as we know it (p.5). Free will, for example, is actively eroded through the behaviourist techniques 
of social media, using distraction and attention manipulation. The commercialisation of data turns unique 
human individuals into data points, and then patterns, for analytical, predictive, and manipulative reasons. 
Freedom of speech turns into performative politics, and the promises of evened out social landscapes become 
tribal echo chambers once more. Potentially, as Kendall-Taylor, Frantz & Wright (2020) conclude, artificial 
intelligence (AI) surveillance could be a tool to still political opposition, giving rise to digital dictatorship. The 
use of digital data analytics for political manipulation is exemplified by the Cambridge Analytica case, where 
87 million people’s data was mined unethically, for political gain (Isaak & Hanna, 2018).  
Returning to the material reality of the Rousseau platform in Italy today: its features and ideology reveal that 
it may be an anti-modern public sphere, with the inherent technical possibility for it to be a tool of repression, 
manipulation, or political persuasion. Lyon (2018), envisages relational surveillance as a tool of manipulation 
which is carried out with the active participation of the surveilled. Taking this as our starting point, we 
specifically consider the utopian promise, and dystopian potential, for the individual citizen situated in 
Western European democracies. We consider surveillance models as key to the political dystopia. Dwivedi et 




al. (2019) point out society has not fully grasped the many ethical considerations associated with AI and big 
data, while Müller and Bostrom (2016) predicted that AI is likely to reach overall human ability in our lifetime. 
Here, we follow the definition of AI by Kaplan & Haenlein (2019: 17), as being ‘a system’s ability to interpret 
external data correctly, to learn from such data, and to use those learnings to achieve specific goals and tasks 
through flexible adaptation’. Bringing such AI into this dynamic marriage of politics and the internet could be 
explosive.  
2. The Pioneering Hope: On the Establishment and Direct Democracy 
Smith (2017) describes the online space as one of potential. Politics in his view is not a corrupting influence, 
nor is it a means to an end. Instead, politics ‘is what makes us free’ (Smith, 2017:4).  In his view, ‘digitizing the 
political and politicizing the digital’ (p.6) brings hope to reinvigorate positive politics. Platform politics in 
particular offer to address ‘the crisis of representation’ in West-European democracy (Lioy, Del Valle & 
Gottlieb, 2019:45). 
This resonates well with the leading vision of the pioneer-inventors of the internet and personal computing in 
the US. They believed that these technologies ‘would democratize access to information, foster wider 
communities, and build a new global commons for communication, commerce, and collaboration.’ (Waldrop, 
2001:4). This vision is decidedly political, and rooted in the historical background of the Cold War. American 
defense was ‘still the sector of government that supports computer technology most vigorously and 
imaginatively’ (Licklider, 1979:95). JCR Licklider described the idea of the ‘Multinet’ (the internet as we know it 
today) in his book chapter ‘Computers and the Government’ (1979). It is as a space for everyone – the 
individual needs would be met in every respect, from online banking, shopping, scheduling, social 
interactions,… These ideas illustrate a liberal society, and include further progressive suggestions such as 
government responsibility to ensure individual privacy. Similarly, in JCR Licklider’s only book, Libraries of the 
Future (1965), he describes from a very technical point of view what could be done to make digital information 
more accessible to all. Democratic politics supports this idea of free-flowing information (Rosenberger, 2018). 
But as AI for public use becomes more prevalent, governments are under pressure to renew regulatory 
frameworks – which could intensify existing citizen-government power asymmetries. Big data was anticipated 
even in the early stages: Licklider hoped governments will ‘generate huge data bases’ with security rules and 
procedures which have been developed with ‘exquisite care and so fully tested, proven, demonstrated, and 
explained that almost everyone accepts their validity and effectiveness’ (1979:92). This is an optimistic 
projection, which he mediates with observations on the ‘issues and problems that are shaping the future of 
computer development’ (Licklider, 197:95), which includes the relative neglect of controlled information 
sharing techniques, and the near impossibility in his view to make operating systems truly secure. Such issues 
are at the forefront of AI debates today too, as demonstrated by the work of the Ada Lovelace Institute in the 
UK, and the review by Dwivedi et al. (2019). Nevertheless, Licklider felt the new online space ‘would give 
politics greater depth and dimension than it now has’ (Licklider, 1979:114). He discussed the benefit of radical 
openness of electoral debate, ‘bringing millions of citizens into active participation through millions of 
channels’ (Licklider, 1979:115). Western ideals of morally superior politics often pertain to various forms of 
democracy, often representational – but the internet is felt to offer ‘direct democracy’ or ‘radical democracy’, 
bringing people closer to the actual decision-making.  Licklider anticipated that the online space ‘may create 
the facilities required for highly participatory political interaction’ (Licklider, 1979:115). Interestingly, those 
spaces which are available today, such as the Rousseau platform for Italy’s M5S, are also seen to put 
‘participatory pressure’ on more traditional, hierarchical political parties (Lioy, Del Valle & Gottlieb, 2019). 
He did see a darker side too: ‘Such an environment and such a process would undoubtedly open up new vistas 
for dirty tricks.’ (Licklider, 1979:115). In his view, the sheer amount of individual people participating in politics 
would outweigh any localised disruptive activity, ‘unless, of course, a government or a syndicate controlled 
and subverted the whole network. Then clandestine artificial-intelligence programs, searching through the 
databases, altering files, fabricating records, and erasing their own audit trails, would bring a new meaning to 
“machine politics” (Licklider, 1979:115).  But he considered it unlikely that his government would develop any 
such computer-based politics, as he termed it (p.115). However, it could be the covert tool of opposing 
politicians (Kaplan & Haenlein, 2020). 
In Norbert Wiener’s well-known book Cybernetics (first edition published in 1948, second edition in 1961), a 
foundational publication for computing and AI, he writes that we embrace ‘technical developments with great  
 




possibilities for good and evil. we can only hand it over into the world that exists about us’ (p.28). He refers to 
Belsen and Hiroshima to illustrate that the world can be a dark place, if it is steered that way by the people 
who live within it. He is particularly concerned where scientific invention concentrates power with that more 
dystopian human intent, but doesn’t feel that is the reason to suppress further technical developments: we 
‘hope that the good of a better understanding of man and society which is offered by this new field of work 
may anticipate and outweigh the incidental contribution we are making to the concentration of power (which 
is always concentrated, by its very conditions of existence, in the hands of the most unscrupulous).’ (p.29).  
Control and responsibility for technology that operates AI is indeed another key part of the debate today 
(Powell, 2020). The underlying philosophy steering the intention of the technical inventors can be said to be 
decidedly human. It focused on increasing human agency, for human purpose. Today’s AI rhetoric still 
captures a concern over human job losses (Frey & Osborne, 2017), but Dwivedi et al. (2019:11) point out that 
there is a continuing need for people to work alongside AI. This is also illustrated by the sequel to the first 
edition of Cybernetics¸ called The Human Use of Human Beings (Wiener, 1950). Similarly, JCR Licklider wanted 
to free up valuable human time by assigning drudgery tasks to the computer (1960); John Atanasoff wanted 
his students freed up from mindless calculation, to instead spend it on creative, inventive thinking (Waldrop, 
2001:36); Douglas Engelbart (1962) described the importance of advanced computing to assist people in their 
human approach to complex decision-making. Certainly, AI was welcomed for these purposes, but human 
thinking and decision-making was still placed higher up the value ladder. There, of course, is also the tricky 
part that human decision-making is consciously or unconsciously politically driven. The technology comes to 
be in service of the human-politician. If technology is awarded its own decision-making capacity, it will 
arguably follow those origins. As Dwivedi et al. (2019:11) states: ‘AI can augment human decision-making, but 
human efforts are also required to augment AI’. 
Under Licklider’s management, a group steered by Marvin Minksy left to create the MIT AI Lab. Their focus 
was more so machine intelligence (rather than augmenting human intelligence), and their political convictions 
made them also ‘deeply suspicious of the establishment’ (Waldrop, 2001:311). Their ambition was to 
construct a free-thinking machine (a contradictio in terminis, perhaps), beyond the settled boundaries of 
human life as they knew it, creating an entirely different driver to the politics of technology. 
From this discussion, it might seem that the internet is a fully intentional, pre-determined construction. This 
was not the case – it is the product of many separate projects and individual thinking and endeavours. As 
described in The Dream Machine (2001), JCR Licklider was one of the people who brought the ARPA 
community together, which culminated in the material successes during the second half of the sixties. As the 
community formed on a practical level, there was also intellectual alignment which can be traced in individual 
writings. Licklider describes this community as one steered by hopefulness (1979:126). However, the 
community was also careful not to position itself explicitly as ‘political’. While ARPA was funded by the 
Pentagon, and the project attracted many enthusiastic students and young researchers to computer science, it 
was also a time of activism and anti-government demonstration in view of the Vietnam war (Waldrop, 2001: 
280). JCR Licklider describes how the US defense was an active and enthusiastic funder of computer research, 
but also that it was a time of prevalent and growing ‘distrust of Washington’ (Licklider, 1979:95). Politics was 
not considered a positive occupation, a concern which Smith (2017) highlights, even though paradoxically the 
anti-war demonstrations were of course political actions in themselves. Politics was, however, associated with 
corruption, hidden agendas, imposed authority (as it sometimes is today in public opinion). The promise of 
future internet technology was liberating. Again paradoxically, technology needed politics to progress, 
towards the future which promised to be anti-political when politics denoted the traditional establishment.  
Licklider (1979) emphasised the need for long-term thinking in technological development, rather than the 
focus on short-term return-on-investment planning. To him, the impact on society was more important than 
budget justifications. Wiener echoes that cautious optimism, because: “Even when the individual believes that 
science contributes to the human ends which he has at heart, his belief needs a continual scanning and re-
evaluation which is only partly possible. [It needs] an imaginative forward glance at history which is difficult, 
exacting, and only limitedly available… We must always exert the full strength of our imagination.” (Wiener, 
1960). The next paragraph will consider present-day examples at that intersection of politics and technology, 
with the actual or presumed role of AI crystallising the potential impact on society further, particularly in view 
of the notion of surveillance. 




3. The Toss of the Coin: Traditional, Relational and Manipulative Surveillance 
This paragraph will discuss how technology can result into a manipulation of the public, as well as bringing 
about a high risk of restricting civil liberties. Surveillance is at the heart of this issue. Much internet-enabled 
technology in present-day society is based on the so-called surveillance capitalism (Zuboff, 2019). Surveillance 
has grown to be a crucial resource for structuring and regulating social relations (Lyon, 2008, 2017, 2018). 
Data on the ways of individuals and social groups, provides watchers with a comparative advantage which 
enables them to predict, anticipate, manipulate or curb any either action or any reaction from those who are 
watched. AI intensifies this. Surveillance has ceased to be a mainly passive, repressive resource, with the main 
aim of pushing back unpredicted flows of social relations, and has grown to be a crucial tool for contemporary 
society. For this reason, such authors as David Lyon (2007, cit.), on the trail of Michel Foucault (2008), call this 
new kind of surveillance as relational. Such a surveillance is rooted in interpersonal relations.  In order to 
understand this concept better, we have to distinguish between three different kinds of surveillance: vertical 
or repressive, horizontal or relational, and, the new one we can outline in relation to politics, the manipulative 
one, which is fuelled by a bottom-up pattern engendering a top-bottom flow. 
3.1. Traditional Surveillance 
The most popular kind of surveillance is the vertical, or repressive one. It is wielded by the State apparatuses, 
such as the police and the magistrates, over the whole population. Its main task consists of controlling social 
interactions to ensure the enforcement of law and the repression of deviant behaviours. It is mediated by laws 
and apparatuses, and it works from the top to the bottom, as its use is regulated by the command of the 
State. Arrests, convictions, imprisonments are consequential to the procedures followed under vertical 
surveillance. Its means are hard, as they are mainly means of physical coercion, such as truncheons, tasers, 
guns, prisons. But AI can be a soft means of informing the hard control, or even replacing it by cover 
manipulation of public thought. AI may become a weapon for preventive control. Either the individuals or the 
groups who are deemed as “at risk” to national security for their lifestyle, ethnicity, religion, can be targeted. 
Metadata thus becomes the technology of politics. Ventura, Deflem and Miller (2005) explain how the Project 
Carnivore enforced by the American government after 9/11 has resulted into a mass targeting and following 
criminalisation for many Muslims holding the US Citizenship. Here, we can assume AI operates solely as a 
government tool, enforcing the establishment from which early AI pioneers sought to break away.  
3.2 Relational Surveillance 
The vertical, repressive forms of control continue to be in force, while a more horizontal surveillance develops 
and spreads across the social fabric. It is a breakthrough form of social control. Firstly, it is not meted out from 
the top to the bottom. While the state is still a crucial actor of surveillance even in this case, its enforcers are 
mainly private actors, such as contractors, software firms, worldwide brands, individuals. AI can be 
operationalised to gather the same wide range of data, but rather than top-to-bottom use, it becomes a 
horizontal means of surveillance, for example for capitalist ambitions. While laws such as the GDPR regulate 
data processing about individuals, AI can add more intelligent data gathering, profiling, and associations. As a 
consequence of this, a preventive control is developed. Linder (2019) discusses how AI produces a re-
territorialisation of surveillance, creating a hub wherein new forms of control are both designed and enacted, 
thus posing a threat to civil liberties. It is the softness of relational surveillance to engender its paradox, which 
we could call the paradox of horizontality, and which we illustrate in the figure 1 below. It is a one-directional 
form of surveillance, which taps the relations in a horizontal way for its own gain. The locus of power is 
identifiable, and AI (likely in the form of a proprietary tool) directly serves the gain of that power, possibly 






Figure 1: The Paradox of Relational Surveillance: The Softness of the Horizontal 




3.3. Network-based Surveillance 
As a further articulation of traditional surveillance and relational surveillance coming together, we are now 
facing a network-based surveillance, involving a plurality of actors. It is carried out through the use of the 
same ‘soft’ means, which are not even perceived by the public as a means of control. There is no clear ‘locus’ 
of surveillance, and the related power and indoctrination. That does not mean it’s not there. An AI monitoring 
and steering this environment might further influence its politics. It operates covertly too, but is still steered 
by human beings, either in its design or continued use. Private actors, such as IT entrepreneurs or TV 
producers, might use AI to create such products as political platforms which allow these private entrepreneurs 
to accumulate data about the public. Single individuals are also involved in surveillance activities. The political 
orientations of the public on such political issues as death penalty, immigration, racism, war, can be obtained 
by creating for example profiling polls on private platforms which are presented to stimulate a direct 
involvement of the public in the decision process. A popular TV slogan on 1980s Berlusconi TV was: “it is you 
who make the show”, luring the public into participating to polls, quizzes and televised votes. This strategy 
had indeed the purpose of gaining a grasp of the public tastes and orientation, for political manipulation. Both 
the Cambridge Analytica and the Rousseau Platform case are examples of this strategy online. Secondly, 
consent is covert at best, with data “extorted” by making the public believe they are expressing their opinion 
or that they are voting freely to orient the decision-maker or the decision itself. The illusion of participatory 
democracy which the technology brings becomes a totalitarian tool. Looking back to the title of Wiener’s 
(1950) book, On the Human Use of Human Beings, acquires a very different meaning in the online political 
surveillance and manipulation of today. The Rousseau platform might look different from the Cambridge 
Analytica case, because only those with an account can access it and also because its aims are explicitly 
political. Despite this, it is a direct development of the old tool, that is the blog of Beppe Grillo (the actor who 
funded the movement), which has been hosting public discussions long before the party was founded. 
Moreover, the Rousseau platform share with Cambridge Analytica the ambiguity of online democracy. On the 
one hand, participants are set free to express themselves on relevant political issues. On the other hand, their 
freedom of expression is regulated by a format set up by the private actors who organised the poll. As 
Sampedro and Mosca (2018) point out, online platforms, far from producing direct democracy, confirm and 
strengthen plebiscitarian leaderism. Figure 2 illustrates what we can call “the format cycle” in the technology 
of politics (or politics of technology?). 
 
Figure 2. The Platform Cycle 
Considering platform politics, with network-based surveillance, it’s hard to tell where the cycle of politics 
begins and ends. The outcome is the elaboration of a political format which pretends to embody the decisions 
of the public, but risks to pose a serious threat to civil liberties due to its surveillance mechanisms. While AI is 
not the cause of that, it can intensify those mechanisms. Firstly, because the participation of the public to the 
political arena is the backbone of democracy, and should not be mediated by purposes of profits which private 
actors pursue. AI platforms in particular may be seen as independent from human influence or decision-
making, but the steering force of machine intelligence still stems in human minds, and therefore is consciously 
or unconsciously political. What would happen if private platforms gain power and the opinion of the public 
would not match their purpose? This question relates directly to the second problem that the technologisation 
of politics poses. Private actors who produce and structure political platforms operate in a double-selective 
way: as well as choosing the issues to be discussed, they also simplify the level of the discussion. Under the 
first aspect, it is evident that it is easier to gain votes by fuelling such issues as crime repression than to 
propose a lenient policy. Some authors have shown how penal populism (Simon, 2007) has helped building the 
careers of those politicians who advocate a law-and-order attitude on crime. This shows all the potential 
danger of leaving in the hands of private actors the discussion of such crucial issues as civil liberties, as the 
combination of the quest for profit with an (alleged) people’s will end up restricting the room for such issues 




are the presumption of innocence and diversity. Secondly, this risk is related to the way political discussion is 
processed. Participants to the platform are left free to express without facing a discussion with other 
counterparts, then they are required to answer to YES/NO questions, without any chance of developing an in-
depth discussion of the issue. As a consequence of this, the public will produce key political decisions without 
an informed position. Indeed, AI can come to inform the human decision-making, much like Licklider (1960) 
envisioned. But who will gather and filter the information for consideration? Again, the machine intelligence 
must not be mistaken as a neutral entity. When Barlow (1996) wrote A Declaration of the Independence of 
Cyberspace, added to the myth of the advanced technology as a politically neutral domain. Moreover, the 
illusion of direct democracy provided by the idea of the internet may bring a sense of entitlement to overcome 
those mechanisms of civil liberty protections, such as the rule of law and the constitutional procedures, which 
have been crucial elements of democracy in the last seventy years. The online space ends up in a constant 
surveillance of the public, which is regularly polled (sometimes overtly, sometimes covertly) to check its 
orientation, and eventually manipulated by political and market strategies worked out to gain economic and 
political control. As AI continues to monitor and steer the mix in this platform cycle, it could become the 
covert actor to all. Where originally it was steered and developed by people, it could become an 
independently steering force, in the network which no longer could identify the source of power clearly. The 
technology has becomes its own politics. 
4. Conclusion 
The pioneering hope often centres on the idea that an individual may be empowered by engaging with the 
online political realm, as a political subject, with individual agency. However, we can question whether all 
individual people engage with online platforms in a political manner; or indeed, if those online platforms are 
overtly constructed as a political realm, or covertly only. In both scenarios (although the covert construction 
may be more suspicious by its nature), a person may become the object of politics, rather than an empowered 
citizen in some form of Western political idealism. AI is welcomed with that hopeful focus on the 
empowerment of individual human beings, and the reinvigoration of participatory politics, as discussed in the 
first half of this paper. At the same time, the pioneers cautioned against naïve adoption of technology, 
especially where political power was at stake. It requires, as Norbert Wiener called it, an ‘imaginative forward 
glance’. While its technological development has complex political roots, the individuals involved in its 
construction were decidedly political themselves. Today, we can see some of those darker sides come into 
effect, as illustrated by the West-European examples addressed in the second half of this paper. The 
imaginative forward glance that brings AI into the mix of online technology and politics can cast a shadow on 
its utopian glimmer, particularly considering models of surveillance which impact the individual citizen.  
Machine intelligence must not be mistaken for being a neutral tool. Especially platforms which employ a 
political surveillance can end up using technology to promote manipulation which, while giving the public the 
illusion of a direct participation to the decision-making process, have indeed the outcome of triggering that 
populism that manipulates the public sphere and discriminates, as well as producing a constant surveillance of 
the public.  
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